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The Function of Capital Exports under Capitalism 
Henryk Grossman 
 
(The following excerpt from Grossmann’s Das Akkumulations- und 
Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems (1929) is an extract from a complete 
translation of the text that will be published along with other writings of Grossmann as 
part of a project that Rick Kuhn is currently handling. The excerpt covers pp. 490 to 530, 
which are part of a long chapter called ‘Modifying countertendencies’.) 
 
 
The function of capital export under capitalism. The overaccumulation of capital 
and the struggle for investment spheres. The role of speculation in capitalism. 
  
(a)  Earlier presentations of the problem 
 
The export of capital is a fact as old as modern capitalism itself. From a scientific point of 
view we have to explain why capital is exported and what role the export of capital plays 
in the mechanism of capitalist production.  
 
Sombart is the best example of the completely superficial way in which these problems 
are discussed in the prevailing theories. According to Sombart, imperialist expansion 
essentially has nothing to do with the role of colonies as sales outlets or raw material 
sources. ‘No one can doubt (!) that economic imperialism basically means that by 
enlarging their sphere of political influence  the capitalist powers have a chance to 
expand the sphere for the investment of their excess capital.’1  
 
Sombart makes the drive for power a precondition for the expansion of capital, a 
conception that is simply false and which I shall disregard here.  The opposite is true: the 
expansion of capital, ‘peaceful financial penetration’, is a precursor of the political 
domination that follows, or, as Sartorius says, ‘capital is the political forerunner’.2 But 
from a purely economic point of view what Sombart fails to explain is why there is such 
a thing as the expansion of capital to foreign territories. This is something self-evident 
for him, which ‘no one can doubt’. What we have to explain in terms of theory is simply 
presupposed as self-evident without proof or analysis. However, as a matter of fact, 
capital exports are by no means as obvious as that. ‘Just as it was normal in the past, so 
too today it is very obvious that the capitals newly acquired or available in a country 
should find employment there.’ Whether one is dealing with enterprises that are being 
expanded or with money capitalists, ‘they allow themselves to be influenced by 
investment prospects in their productive activity, by how easily these are available in 
terms of the ability to obtain a profit or the yield on their bonds. For all of which the best 
chances are generally those available to them in the national economy’.3  Only here does 
the economy reckon with known, predictable factors. So why are capitals not invested in 
the capitalist home country itself? Because they are ‘superfluous’ there? But what does 
superfluous mean? Under what conditions can a capital become superfluous? 4 Sombart 
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simply uses journalistic cliches without the faintest attempt to clarify concepts 
scientifically. Yet the issue has been debated for a whole century, ever since Ricardo 
raised the question whether there is a compulsion to export capital only to deny that there 
is. ‘It is, however, always a matter of choice in what way a capital shall be employed… 
When merchants engage their capitals in foreign trade, or in the carrying trade, it is 
always from choice, and never from necessity: it is because in that trade their profits will 
be somewhat greater than in the home trade’.5 Sombart simply leaves the key problem to 
one side. 
 
S. Schilder’s ‘scientific discovery’ is even more hopeless. The interrelations between the 
export trade and the foreign investments of creditor countries supposedly ‘represent an 
equalising mechanism that works in a way similar to the mechanism implied in the 
relationship between exchange rates and foreign trade’. For example, if British overseas 
investments fall, then there is a growing surplus of commodity imports into Britain. ‘A 
more rapid growth of this surplus of imports may be regarded as a symptom that for 
whatever reason British overseas investment activity has stalled, whereas, in contrast, a 
slower growth…of this import surplus suggests that overseas investments have picked 
up.’ 
 
‘However’, Schilder goes on to complain, ‘economics has so far failed to take note of this 
peculiar play of economic forces’.6 Schilder wants to claim he has discovered a peculiar 
‘equalising mechanism’ where, in reality, there is simply the usuial subtraction that has 
nothing to do ‘a play of economic forces’ and even less with the science of economics. 
Since capital exports are basically in part at least an export of commodities, it follows 
that one has a straightforward case of subtraction when, for a given magnitude of imports, 
every reduction in the export of commodities necessarily increases the surplus of imports. 
 
In his book on imperialism J. A. Hobson maintains that foreign investments form ‘the 
most important factor in the economics of imperialism’ and are becoming ever more 
important.7 ‘Aggressive imperialism…which is fraught with such grave incalculable peril 
to the citizen, is a source of great gain to the investor who cannot find at home the 
profitable use he seeks for his capital, and insists that his Government should help him to 
profitable and secure investments abroad.’8  But why are profitable investments not to be 
found at home? This decisively important question is not touched on even once by 
Hobson, just as his book tends in general to avoid all problems of theory, even if it 
constitutes a valuable descriptive work. 
 
In Sartorius v. Waltershausen, likewise, one finds no answer to the question posed, even 
though he  takes up the problem in a special chapter and asks, ‘Why does domestic 
capital invest abroad?’9 ‘For private investors the decisive issues concern the prospects of 
interest, dividends and stock prices, as well as how secure investments are, their duration 
and the mode of repatriation’, etc. (p. 52)  But what is the economic compulsion at work 
here? This question is not clarified. Sartorius merely states that ‘in today’s world 
economy the agrarian countries are long-term recipients of capital, the industrial 
countries donors’. (p. 52) But why? Sartorius confines himself to the assertion that in the 
agrarian countries ‘capital formation is at a much lower stage than it is in countries that 
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have an advanced industry’. (p. 19) But why? ‘However’, he goes on to say, ‘even the 
economically advanced countries stand in debtor/creditor relationships to one another’. 
(p. 52)  Obviously, the agrarian/industrial distinction cannot account for export of capital. 
In that case what is the driving force behind this? Sartorius says nothing about that. He 
refers in passing to the fact that ‘in countries that are economically saturated and have a 
mass of savings to lend the class of lenders of capital grows and that of entrepreneurs 
falls relatively. The rate of interest tends to stay low and perhaps even to decline further’.  
When, under what circumstances, is a country ‘economically saturated’?  Sartorius 
simply describes the fact instead of explaining it. ‘There is the mass of disposable 
capitals for everyone to see. The more extensively this appears on the market in relation 
to the opportunities for investment, the more the rate of interest falls.’ As capital is now 
exported abroad, ‘export capitalism counteracts the fall in the national rate of interest’. (p. 
35) Underlying this whole discussion is a notion of ‘economic saturation’, of a surplus of 
disposable capital in relation to the opportunities for investment. But this notion is not 
explained. Why, under what circumstances, are investment opportunities restricted for 
capital? Sartorius appars to have a vague feeling that a state of saturation and thus of 
export of capital is linked to a relatively advanced stage of capitalist development. When 
citing the case of Japanese expansion in China he notes, ‘To be successful in China what 
the Japanese currently lack in any case is an important precondition, namely, extensive 
capital export, which is only conceivable when the island kingdom has reached a much 
higher stage of economic development than is true at the moment’. (p. 52) The ‘drive to 
expand economically’, the tendency to invest capital abroad, is thus tied in with two 
factors: first the ‘lack of investment opportunities at home’, (p. 54) and second, a much 
higher stage of capitalist development. No attempt is made to go beyond these empirical 
statements, in particular Sartorius fails to show why under these conditions ‘a state of 
saturation’ is bound to emerge.10 
 
The treatment of the problem of capital exports in Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman is 
just as unsatisfying. They of course are the authors of a book on American imperialism.11 
Why is capital exported? Their answer is that in the leading industrial countries of Europe 
the export of capital emerged at a time when ‘the surpluses in the domestic economy 
were more profitably invested abroad than at home’. They describe the actual situation 
without explaining it. Why is it that capital cannot be invested as profitably at home as it 
can be abroad?  Is that simply an accident, a chance configuration of the economic 
relations between the national and the international? Why do such contingencies occur 
only in certain countries, whereas others like the USA, for example, have been importing 
capital for over a century? Yet the authors themselves point out that the industrial 
countries of Europe only became capital exporters at a specific stage in their 
development. The same is true of the USA. ‘At the beginning of the present [twentieth] 
century the United States had reached this point in its economic developpment.’ In other 
words, the key factors behind the export of capital are not chance configurations of 
market relations between domestic and international economies but the laws that govern 
the economic evolution of a given country internally, viz. a determinate stage of that 
evolution. The United States had simply not developed that far at any stage in the 19th 
century and only finally reached it at the start of the 20th century. The trend was then 
accelerated by the war and ‘the experiences of the war compressed into a decade a 
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process that would have extended, ordinarily, over a much longer period’. But what were 
those ‘experiences’? The enrichment of the USA by the war.  It follows that enrichment 
is a factor that speeds up the export of capital. In other words, capital exports depend on 
the extent of a country’s wealth  and not on random occurrences in the world market. The 
authors show that while there is a ‘capital surplus’ in the US, in Canada, for example, 
there is a ‘capital shortage’.12 ‘The United States was still a net debtor to the outside 
world in 1913…The war of 1914 greatly expedited the transformation of the United 
States from a debtor into a creditor nation.’13 Why there had to be such surpluses, why 
the domestic economy contained no opportunities for investment, is something the 
authors have failed to show.14 
 
But even in the Marxist literature one looks in vain for an explanation of the true function 
of capital exports, even though in the last few years a great deal of attention has been 
given to this problem and the problem of why capital migrates. The question of exactly 
what role and function Marx’s theory assigns to the export of capital is never raised, 
much less answered.  Marxist writers have seen and described the appearances that 
present themselves at a surface level but not attempted to integrate those into Marx’s 
overall system. So Varga says, ‘The importance of capital exports for monopoly 
capitalism was analysed in detail (!) by Lenin in Imperialism; hardly anything new can be 
added’.15 In actual fact Varga abstains from any theoretical analysis. In an essay called 
‘Capital export in the world economy’ he adduces empirical evidence on the scale and 
direction of international exports of capital.16 Yet there is no trace of any theoretical 
penetration of the issue in this work.  ‘The rate of profit’, he says, ‘regulates not only the 
influx of capital into individual branches of industry, but also its geographical migrations. 
Capital is invested abroad whenever there are prospects of obtaining a higher rate of 
profit’. This conclusion is hardly original. Ricardo himself pointed out that the level of 
the rate of profit determines the movement of capital not only between different spheres 
of production in the domestic economy but likewise between countries, as long as there is 
free competition, that is, no obstacles of a legal or factual nature restricting such 
movement.17 However, Varga fails to understand the true dimensions of the problem 
when he goes on to say, ‘Capital is exported not  because it is absolutely impossible for it 
to accumulate domestically without “thrusts into non-capitalist markets”, but because 
there is a prospect of higher profit elsewhere’. In other words, Varga starts from the false 
assumption that whatever its total magnitude capital can find an unlimited range of 
investment possibilities at home. He overlooks the simple fact that in denying the 
possibility of an overabundance of capital, he simultaneously denies the possibility of an 
overproduction of commodities. Further, Varga imagines that any argument that there are 
definite limits to the accumulation of capital and that capital exports necessarily follow 
because of that is incompatible with Marx’s own ideas and can only be sustained from 
the perspective of Luxemburg’s thesis of the necessary existence of non-capitalist 
countries. 
 
In what follows I want to show that Varga’s conception is untenable, that it was precisely 
Marx who showed that an unlimited investment of capital in any single country is 
impossible and explained the conditions under which there emerges an absolute 
overaccumulation of capital and therefore also the compulsion to export capital abroad. 
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Varga does not notice that his conception of unlimited investment possibilities flatly 
contradicts any labour theory of value and is incompatible with it. Investment of capital 
requires surplus-value. But surplus-value is labour and in any single country labour is a 
given magnitude (eine gegebene Größe). From a working population whose size is given 
one can only squeeze a definite maximum mass of surplus labour even if there is some 
elasticity in that quantum. The idea that capital can be expanded without limits is 
tantamount to the idea that surplus-value is likewise expandable without limits and thus 
independent of the size of the population, which is equivalent to saying that surplus-value 
does not depend on labour.   
 
The same is, literally, true of Bukharin. What are the true causes of capitalist expansion?  
In Bukharin’s conception these lie solely in the surplus profits to be gained abroad. 
Bukharin runs around in circles when on the one hand he underscores the absolute 
necessity for capitalist expansion and therefore imperialism but on the other hand claims 
that capital is exported to countries abroad only because ‘concrete development’ always 
occurs as a line of least resistance. ‘If there was no additional market, that fact alone 
could not destroy the foundations of the existence of capitalism.’18 If one believes that 
there is no compulsion driving the export of capital, then one bars the way to any serious 
understanding of the economic basis of imperialism. 
 
Nachimson (Spectator) contents himself with the assertion that ‘the modern industrial 
nations possess more capital than they themselves need under the prevaling conditions 
and therefore they export it’.19 What it means to say ‘possess more capital than they need’ 
is not explained.   
 
Sternberg visualises the problem of capital export in a wholly simplistic manner, as the 
ratio of capital C to labour supply L, thus C/L, where the denominator has to keep 
growing, that is, there always has to be a surplus population of free workers (e.g. a ratio 
of 50/60) ‘for the valorisation of capital to be possible…If the numerator grows too big, 
the result is expansion of capital’.20 Such is the level of sophistication he shows in 
tackling a problem that has been at the centre of a theoretical controversy for an entire 
century! For what does it mean for the numerator to grow ‘too big’? What exactly is the 
measure here and where are the limits? How do we define these limits? Such questions 
simply do not occur to Sternberg. He completely fails to mention that any conception of 
capital growing exceptionally large necessarily presupposes a certain state of technology 
and thus also of the organic composition of capital. Suppose the organic composition is 
20c:80v, then from every 100 units of capital 80 are used to employ a given number of 
workers and only 20 for means of production. If 25c is used in the numerator, that is, for 
means of production, so that the ratio becomes 25C/80L, then for the given level of 
technology 5 units of capital are ‘superfluous’ and the result is that capital has to be 
exported. But if the organic composition changes to 60c:40v, then to hire the same 
number of workers we shall now need not 20c but 120c. The capital ratio is thus 
120C/80L; with a further advance of the organic composition to 80c:20v, the numerator 
can expand to 320c and we end with the fraction 320C/80L. So what does it mean to say 
the numerator grows ‘too large’?  What is too large at a lower organic composition is not 
large enough at a higher one.  
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On the other hand, does this not seem to imply that to create unlimited possibilities for 
capital investment all we need to do is introduce technical advances, a progressively 
higher organic composition of capital? In that case, why do capital exports occur? What 
compels the businessman to export capital? Sternberg’s answer is simple: capital’s 
expansion abroad is the most powerful factor in creating a surplus population. By 
reinforcing the reserve army it depresses the level of wages and enables a surplus-value 
to arise (!). Export of capital ‘is therefore one of the strongest pillars supporting the 
capital relation’, (p. 36) because a surplus-value can arise ‘only if there is a surplus 
population’. (pp. 16, 585)  
 
In short, export of capital is supposed to be the key factor behind surplus population. Yet 
in Germany in the years 1926–1927 we saw the exact opposite; massive inflows of 
foreign capital were crucial to the general wave of rationalisation of plants and played a 
major role in displacing workers or creating a surplus population. If the export of capital 
was simply a matter of reducing the the ‘numerator’ (the amount of capital) so as to 
reduce the demand for labour, then a simple transfer of capital would be enough to solve 
this. For example, German capitalists can emigrate to Canada with their capital and never 
return home. But this is not an export of capital so much as a change in its nationality or a 
loss of capital. If one’s only understanding is in terms of ‘reducing the numerator’, one 
fails to grasp the most essential aspect of the export of capital. As Hilferding correctly 
explained, ‘By “export of capital” I mean the export of value which is intended to breed 
surplus value abroad. It is essential from this point of view that the surplus value should 
remain at the disposal of the domestic capital…The export of capital reduces pro tanto 
the domestic stock of capital and increases the national income by the amount of surplus 
value produced’.21 If it were simply a matter of reducing the ‘numerator’, this essential 
feature of capital exports would become irrelevant. 
 
It is superfluous to have to waste more time on a critique of Sternberg’s formula. Like all 
the other phenomena of capitalist economy Sternberg seeks to explain the export of 
capital solely through the holy grail of vulgar economy, namely, competition.22 Yet we 
know that the problem is precisely to explain the basic features of capitalism (and export 
of capital is one of them) in abstraction from any form of competition including the 
existence of a surplus population and on the assumption at the start of the analysis that 
capitalism is in a state of equlibirum. What compels the capitalist to export capital when 
there is no reserve army of labour and the commodity labour-power is sold at its value?  
 
Hilferding is no clearer about the issue, however. We’ve seen that he denies that a 
generalised overproduction of commodities is either possible or necessary and derives 
crises solely from disproportionality. Moreover, he thinks that Marx’s reproduction 
scheme shows that ‘any expansion of production allowed by the available productive 
forces appears possible’.23 So according to Hilferding there are no limits whatsoever to 
any and every capital being invested in a country’s production. Export of capital to 
countries abroad only occurs because one can expect a higher rate of profit there. ‘The 
precondition for the export of capital is the variation in rates of profit, and the export of 
capital is the means of equalizing national rates of profit.’24   
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The same holds true of Bauer, literally so. Bauer too defends the view that with a 
proportional distribution of capital between the different branches of production there are 
no limits to the investment outlets available to any given capital in a capitalist country. 
Inequality of profit rates is thus the sole reason why capital is exported. ‘The rate of 
profit in the less developed countries that are the object of the expansionist policy of 
capitalism is initially higher than in Europe’, says Bauer. ‘Now, capitalist competition 
always strives to equalize rates of profit; capital always flows to where the rate of profit 
is highest’.25 The export of capital is explained in terms of a ‘tendency for the rate of 
profit to equalise’. But Bauer realises that that this explanation is quite useless when it 
comes to understanding the phenomena of modern imperialism. For the tendency to the 
equalisation of profit rates is a long-standing feature of the capitalist mechanism. So how 
can it explain the fact that capital exports have seen a major surge in all the advanced 
capitalist countries only in the last few decades and this is also when the struggle for 
spheres of investment has taken on more ferocious forms and become one of the 
characteristic features of modern imperialism? Bauer himself says; ‘The drive for new 
spheres of investment and new markets is as old as capitalism itself. It existed in the 
capitalist city republics of Italy during the Renaissance just as it does in England and in 
Germany today. But the sheer force of this tendency has grown enormously in recent 
decades’.26 Great Britain’s ‘investments abroad appear to grow more rapidly than at 
home’.27 So how is the increasing force of this tendency to be explained?  
 
Bauer’s answer: The mobility of capital is a precondition for its migration, but that in turn 
depends on well-organised administrative and judicial systems. ‘Through the agency of 
modern armies and navies, the legal conditions are being created in the countries not yet 
subjected to capitalism to enable capital to seek spheres of investment there, too.’28 
Superbly ‘well-organised’ justice and administration indeed that they have to be ‘created’ 
through modern militarism and navalism! Yet this sentence only tells us the opposite of 
what Bauer wished to prove, namely, that capitalism can lend capital even to countries 
that do not have well-organised administration and justice because the capitalists of the 
exporting nation have the military and diplomatic backing of their state, and if need be 
the army and navy can be called on as agents of compulsion. Thus the aggressive 
character of modern imperialism as one of the characteristic features of the latest era of 
capitalism, something that has to be explained, is cited by Otto Bauer as the explanation 
for rising exports of capital!29 Apart from this, however, if higher rates of profit are what 
account for the flow of capital to the less developed countries of Asia, Africa, America 
and so on, then it is impossible to understand why capital should ever be invested in the 
industries of the advanced capitalist world (Europe and the USA), given their lower rates 
of profit, or why their systems of production are being constantly expanded. Why is the 
whole surplus-vale not earmarked for capital export? In any case we know that the 
tendency to equalisation of the rates of profit means that the rate of profit in the advanced 
capitalist countries is not lower than the rate of profit in the backward countries, that the 
world market sees the formation of an average rate of profit just as individual countries 
do internally, because countries with a higher organic composition of capital sell their 
commodities at prices of production that stand above their values. In this way the capital 
of the advanced countries appropriates a portion of the surplus-value produced in the less 
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advanced countries. Bauer knows this at p. 247 of his book but forgets it at p. 461, when 
he comes to deal with the roots of capital export and the capitalist drive into foreign 
territories. If earlier he himself could show that on the world market, when two countries 
that stand at different stages of development deal with each other, ‘the surplus value 
produced by the workers in those territories is not divided between the capitalists of those 
countries according to the quantity of labour expended in each of them but according to 
the magnitude of the capital that is active in each of them’, he then falls back on the banal 
idea that the higher rate of profit of the less developed country is the cause of capital 
exports. It is not the rate of profit but the mass of surplus-value exacted by capital on a 
pro rata basis that is higher in these countries! We should recall the earlier argument: just 
as in a conceptually isolated capitalism entrepreneurs equipped with technologies more 
advanced than the social average sell their commodities at socially average prices and 
earn a surplus profit at the expense of other entrepreneurs, so on the world market 
countries with the most advanced technologies earn superprofits (Überprofite) at the 
expense of countries with a lower organic composition whose technical and economic 
development is more backward. This is what stimulates and simultaneously drives capital 
to keep developing technology, to push through continuous increases in the organic 
composition of capital in the advanced capitalist countries. Yet this only means that as 
technology develops and progressively higher levels of organic composition are 
introduced, a field simultaneously emerges for more profitable investments. However 
high profits may be in the colonial countries, they would appear to be even higher by way 
of the surplus profits that capitalist magnates make in the chemical and heavy industries 
at home, that is, in those branches that have a higher organic composition of capital. 
Which again raises the question why capital is exported at all. This whole pattern simply 
cannot be explained by the theory that higher rates of profit tempt capital to migrate. 
 
On the other hand, it is not true that the organic composition of capital is always lower in 
the countries that have only recently been opened up for capitalist production. If the 
countries of western Europe needed 150 years to evolve from the organisational forms of 
the manufacturing period to the very advanced capitalist world trust, the colonial 
countries of Asia, Africa and South America do not need to repeat the entire process. 
They take over the capital that flows from Europe in the most mature forms that have ** 
in the womb of the advanced capitalist countries. In this way they skip over a whole 
series of historical stages, with the black indigenous populations of South Africa 
uprooted from their villages and hurled straight into gold and diamond mines dominated 
by trustified capital and its advanced forms of technical and financial organisation.30 
When oil drilling starts in Ecuador, Sumatra, Venezuela, or Trinidad, then the only most 
modern technical methods and installations are used, oil pipelines and storage tanks laid 
out, refineries constructed, and so on.  For example, in Ecuador where there are three 
refineries, there are storage tanks in Ancon and Liberdad and threre’s a pipeline in 
operation between Ancon and Liberdad.31 
 
In British India there are refineries at Rawalpindi that have a pipeline of 70 kilometres, in 
Rangoon there are tanks that can contain up to 9 million barrels of oil, and Sarawak has 
an underwater pipeline.32 In the Dutch Indies the huge refinery at Pankalan-Brandan 
(Perlak) in Sumatra processes around 10,000 barrels of crude oil a day and stores over 1 
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million barrels. Pipelines lead from Perlak to the refineries at Pladjoe, Susa, etc. The 
refinery at Balikpapan in Borneo is the second largest refinery in the world.33 The 
existing storage tanks (not including those under construction) have a capacity of 1.2 
million cubic metres. On the islands of the Dutch Indies hydroelectric stations of 3 
million horse-power had been constructed down to 1923, designed for the electrification 
of the railways, and of the paper, chemicals and rubber industries. (In 1920 the whole of 
Europe had only 8.8 million horse-power.)34 In Palestine they are building an entirely 
new type of hydroelectric station. A system of canals and punps will bring the water from 
the Mediterranean to upto 87 metres above the Mediterranean’s sea-level, and 380 metres 
above the Jordan, which means 510 metres above the level of the Dead Sea. The power 
generated by the water’s fall isn scheduled to be used for pumping stations as well as the 
electrification of all of the country’s industries, its railways and agriculture.35 Does Bauer 
seriously believe that when railways are constructed in Africa or South America by 
British capitalists, this happens because the railway system in colonial countries has a 
lower organic composition of capital than it does in Britain? The meat industry of 
Argentina is scarcely an appendage to the country’s agriculture, as if based on craft 
principles, but an industry run in massive freezer installations equipped with the latest 
technology, with vast sums of capital invested in it by the meatpackers of Chicago. This 
is an industry that could only have come up on the basis of the most technology, 
revolutions in transport and freezing technology (refrigerated waggons and merchant 
ships with refrigerators), but that presumes a high organic composition of capital.  
 
The quebracho industry of Argentina’s forests has long ceased to saw the timber into 
blocks and export it abroad. Today tannin production is run as a large-scale capitalist 
industry. The system for obtaining the tannin extract is based on radial diffusion. The 
blocks are first pulverised in machines and the wood powder then placed in extractors 
that separate the tannin from the cellulose. The tannin is then concentrated in a pneumatic 
apparatus. The average yield of quebracho wood is a 25% tannin extract, from which one 
still has to remove any coloured and resinous particles. From the sort of technology 
involved it is already evident that the obtention of tannin is possible only as a very 
advanced capitalist enterprise run by large chemical concerns. The same is true of the 
milk industry. It is equipped with the most modern apparatuses for milking and 
sterilisation, separators, condensers, and so on. In all these sectors that have been set up 
with the latest technology the organic composition of capital is certainly no lower than it 
is in analogous enterprises in the advanced capitalist countries of western Europe.   
 
Bauer senses that there is no factual basis to the argument that the migration of capital is 
prompted by higher rates of profit in the newly opened countries, so he tries to bolster his 
argument with various other factors in the conviction that piling up doubtful arguments is 
a good substitute for a correct explanation of the actual pattern. He says, ‘In the capitalist 
economy of a country, a portion of the social money capital is always removed from the 
circulation of industrial capital. To be sure, this released money capital flows into the 
banks and is from there directed into the sphere of production again.’ Till that happens, 
however, there is ‘always a certain lapse of time’. If we look at matters in the flux of the 
reproduction process, it follows that ‘at any one time a portion of the social money capital 
is brought to a standstill and lies fallow’.36 Bauer then goes on to say, ‘If too much 
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money capital is brought to a standstill’, the consequences are disastrous for capitalist 
production. ‘To start with, the turnover time of capital is prolonged….within the turnover 
time of capital, the production time constitutes the lesser part, the circulation time the 
greater part’. However, since value and thus surplus-value are only created in production, 
the decline of production time entails a reduction of surplus-value and profit. Therefore 
capitalism’s economic policy involves a drive for spheres of investment that will absorb 
the idle money capital. Capital deploys a series of measures, for example, tariff barriers, 
to this end in order to ‘attract’ the inert money capital ‘into the sphere of production’ with 
the promise of surplus profits. The ultimate aim of these endeavours is to ‘reconfigure the 
ratio between idle and productive capital, production time and circulation time in a more 
favourable way’. 
 
Capital exports are thus one of the means used to steer the money capital excluded from 
the circulation of industrial capital and lying idle back into the sphere of production. ‘The 
subjection of economically backward countries to exploitation by the capitalist class of a 
European country has two series of effects: in direct terms, spheres for investment of 
capital in the colonized country and thereby increased sales opportunities for the industry 
of the colonizing country; in indirect terms, new spheres of investment for capital also in 
the colonizing land itself…The quantity of capital brought to a standstill in the country at 
any one moment is thereby reduced.’37 
 
Thus Bauer proposes a second theory to explain the export of capital, alongside the one 
mentioned earlier. The first conception involved productive capital and the choice facing 
it to invest either in the productive sectors of the domestic economy or in colonial 
countries. The export of capital to the colonial countries is preferred because the rate of 
profit is higher there than it is in the metropolitan country. Now however we are told that 
one is dealing not with the capital that is active in production in the metropolitan centres 
but with idle money capital that yields not a lower rate of profit but no profit at all. The 
function of capital exports is to find new investment opportunities for this unemployed 
money capital. So Bauer has two completely different explanations of capital export and 
conflates them. 
 
So how do we assess the correctness of this ‘theory’? Bauer argues that the unemployed 
capital that looks for investment is exported abroad and that wherever there is a large 
mass of money capital seeking investment, the rate of interest falls. ‘The banks quite 
directly perceive the relationship of unproductive to invested capital…in the movement 
of the interest rate.’38 But Bauer confuses the money capital that lies idle in the banks 
with capital that seeks investment.  
 
A portion, and in fact a growing portion of the total social capital (one that grows 
absolutely even if it is always declining in relative terms compared with the magnitude of 
sales) always has to exist in money form, in the shape of money capital. If reproduction is 
to be continuous, the size of this portion cannot be reduced at will. Marx showed this in 
Volume Two of Capital in hs analysis of the circuit of money capital. Next to the latter 
he also distinguishes commodity capital and productive capital and speaks of the three 
forms or circuits or figures of the circulation process. All three forms are necessary and 
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condition each other mutually. ‘If we take all three forms together, then all the premises 
of the process appear as its result.’39 It turns out that ‘every particular circuit (implicitly) 
presuppose[s] the others’.40 Both individual and social capital pass through all three 
phases in succession. ‘In reality…each individual industrial capital is involved in all three 
at the same time…Here, therefore, the entire circuit is the real unity of its three forms.’41  
The time that capital spends in each of the three phases is not arbitrary, something 
determined by the will of the bankers or industrial capitalists, but objectively given, both 
in terms of the nature of the particular brtanch of production and through the social 
organisation of the circulation process as a whole. ‘It lies in the nature of the case…that 
the circuit itself determines that capital is tied up for certain intervals in the particular 
sections of the cycle. Only after it has fulfilled the function corresponding to the 
particular form it is in’ does capital assume the next form of the circuit.42  A part of the 
circulating capital must therefore always have the form of money capital as a fund for 
purchases and sales that have fixed deadlines.43 Because the size of money capital (like 
that of commodity capital and productive capital) is not arbitrarily determined,  definite 
numerical ratios must obtain in the division of both individal and social capital into each 
of the forms; as Marx says, ‘definite numerical ratios must obtain in its division into 
parts’44 if the reproduction process is to carry on without interruption. ‘The size of the 
capital involved determines the scale of the production process, and this determines the 
volume of commodity capial and money capital, in so far as these function alongside the 
production process.’45 And Marx recapitulates the results of his investigation in the 
following way: ‘Certain laws were discovered, according to which major components of 
a given capital, varying according to the conditions of the turnover, must constantly be 
advanced and renewed in the form of money capital, in order to keep a productive capital 
of a given size in constant functioning’.46 ‘According to the length of the turnover period, 
a greater or lesser quantity of money capital is needed to set the productive capital in 
motion.’47 So although money capital creates no value and thus no surplus-value since it 
belongs to the sphere of circulation, and although it limits the operation of the productive 
part of capital48 but is itself unproductive and lies fallow, on the basis of the capitalist 
mode of production it cannot be either cast aside or arbitrarily reduced, because despite 
being unproductive and idle, it does fufill necessary functions and ‘because the 
reproduction process itself includes unproductive functions’.49  So even if the quantity of 
the money capital that is required varies according to the structure of the social exchange 
mechanism, all the same at any given time it is an exactly determined magnitude that can 
be calculated according to the law formulated by Marx. ‘For a given velocity of 
circulation of money… the aggregate amount of money in circulation in a given period is 
determined by the sum total of commodity prices to be realised plus the sum total of 
payments falling due during the same period minus the payments that cancel each other 
out.’50    
 
Bauer turns all this upside down. If Marx sees idle money capital as only a portion of the 
functioning industrial capital as this completes a circuit that embraces the unity of 
commmodity, money and productive capital, for Bauer the capital that lies idle is a 
money capital that is ‘removed from the circuit of capital’.51 For Marx the size of the 
money capital is determined by the length of the turnover period, so that a smaller sum of 
money capital is required when the turnover is shortened, whereas in Bauer the length of 
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the turnover period depends on the size of the money capital. ‘If too much money capital 
lies fallow, the reflux of the released splinters of capital into the sphere of production 
occurs only gradually.’52 So instead of a slower turnover tying up too much money 
capital, the amassing of too much money capital slows down the turnover!  It is not the 
sphere of production that determines what happens in the sphere of circulation, but the 
reverse, the movements in circulation that are decisive for production. ‘Every change in 
the proportion of fallow capital to invested capital, of productive capital to capital in 
circulation…completely transforms the face of capitalist society.’53 And this mystical 
power of completely transforming the face of bourgeois society by means of changes in 
the proportion of idle to invested capital lies in the hands of the banks.  ‘They quite 
consciously make a more favorable structuring of this relationship  the goal of all 
economic policy… [T]hey can easily impose their will. But it is also they who first make 
expansionism possible in the sense that thanks to the sheer quantity of capital available to 
them at any one time, they are able to direct the flow of capital abroad, to the subjugated 
territories, in a planned manner.’54 So now we finally know why capital is exported to the 
colonial countries! That is something the modern banks want, and they can easily have 
their way. They consciously work to reduce the mass of the money capital and by doing 
so they transform the whole picture of capitalist society…And the objective laws of 
capitalist circulation? Obviously these belong to the realm of fantasy, at best they are 
valid only for the period before the rise of today’s big banks. 
 
In spite of the remarkable simplicity of Bauer’s explanation, one cannot completely 
suppress a feeling of doubt about how correct it is. For in the first place, even if everyone 
today seems to agree that the laws of circulation formulated by Marx have been 
‘superseded’, we still cnanot follow Bauer completely; all the more so as the bourgeois 
economists themselves side with Marx’s obsolete viewpoint in opposition to Bauer and 
despite their enormous admiration for the bankers. They themselves absolutely deny that 
the banks can arbitrarily manipulate the export of capital!  ‘ “Directing” the flow of 
capital’, says Adolf Weber, ‘isn’t so easy. We shouldn’t forget that not only in the 
national economy but obviously internationally as well the allocation of capital occurs 
according to laws that are intrinsic to business. If the domestic market cannot do without 
the resources that are diverted to foreign countries, there would soon be a flow in the 
opposite direction that would frustrate the proposed attempt.’55  So there is simply no 
question of ‘conscious direction’ and ‘banks having their way’. Only superfluous capital 
can be exported to foreign countries. In the second place, however, if for a moment we 
accept Bauer’s assumption that the struggle for investment spheres serves the purpose of 
‘diminishing the mass of idle capital and speeding up its flow into the sphere of 
production’, in other words that ‘modern capitalist expansionism ultimately aims only to 
transform the ratio between productive and idle capital’,56 it still remains unexplained 
why this alteration of the ration should be thought to be best achieved through the export 
of capital to the colonies. In fact, Bauer assures us that the capital which is exported 
could just as well be employed in sectors of production in the domestic economy. ‘It may 
be’, writes Bauer, ‘that the capital that flows into foreign regions would have temporarily 
remained unproductive if this outlet had not been provided. But no capital remains 
permanently unproductive, the exported capital would eventually have found its way into 
the sphere of production at home, too’.57 It seems truly astonishing that the banks should 
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prefer to invest in the furthest parts of the globe where they can only find security for 
their capital ‘with the protection of military force’, when they can just as well find 
spheres for investment in the domestic economy and bring about that alteration in the 
ratio of productive to idle capital in regions that are much closer and better known to 
them without having to take recourse to military force and solely with the protection of 
the ‘orderly judicial system’ that prevails in the country.  Finally, Bauer refers to fallow 
‘money capital’ which is expelled from the circulation of industrial capital and then 
directed back into production through the export of capital. But from statistics on 
international trade Bauer knows that international capital movements take place mainly in 
the form of commodities, hardly ever in money form, as money capital. It was precisely 
Marx who showed hat we have to look beyond the veil of money to what actually 
happens on the side of commodities. Obviously Bauer thinks even this discovery of 
Marx’s has been superseded and lacks any contemporary relevance. So again I’d like to 
quote a solid bourgeois reporter from one of the business papers, who still defends this 
outdated conception even today. ‘The most important precondition for an export of 
capital is always the commodity background that stands behind the movement of money. 
America’s huge export of capital in 1924–1927 was ultimately an export of cotton (to 
help Central Europe rebuild her reserves), foodstuffs (to satisfy increased European 
demand) and finally [to a lesser degree, HG] an actual export of gold (partly to replenish 
Europe’s gold reserves). Holland’s export of capital was a means of cashing in on the raw 
material exports of her colonial empire (rubber)…Sweden’s capacity to export capital has 
a different commodity background, it is based on an increase in timber exports’, to which 
we might add the export of iron ore as well.58 
 
It is not money capital but commodity capital that is expelled from the circuit of 
industrial capital, which only means that there is an overproduction of commodity capital 
that is unsaleable and which cannot therefore find its way back into production. Indeed, 
Bauer himself tells us that the export of capital creates an outlet for the sale of 
commodities. The confused conception of money capital that is extruded from the circuit 
of industrial capital and therefore flows to distant colonial countries by means of capital 
export, leaves the whole issue of export of capital as little explained as the theory that 
capital migrates as a result of differences in the level of the rate of profit. But: satis 
supraque!    
 
b)  Overaccumulation and export of capital in Marx’s conception 
 
Marx starts by citing the views of the classical economists, namely, J. B. Say and 
Ricardo. The latter defended the view that every amount of capital can be invested in a 
capitalist country without any limitation at all. There ‘cannot, then, be accumulated in a 
country any amount of capital which cannot be employed productively’. 59 This is where 
Marx’s critique begins. The proposition, Marx says, ‘that any amount of capital can be 
employed productively in any country’ is simply ‘the form which Ricardo liked 
particularly’ for Say’s conception that ‘demand and suppy are identical’.60  
 
This view of Say and Ricardo is torn to pieces, with biting scorn and inexorable logic, in 
the chapter called ‘Overproduction of commodities and overabundance of capital’.61   
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‘Ricardo’, Marx says, ‘is always consistent. For him, therefore, the statement that no 
overproduction of commodities is possible is synonymous with the statement that 
no…overabundance of capital is possible’.62  The ‘stupidity of his successors’ is reflected 
in the fact that they ‘deny overproduction in one form (as a general glut of commodities 
in the market) and not only admit its existence in another form (as overproduction of 
capital…overabundance of capital) but actually turn it into an essential point in their 
doctrine’.63   
 
The difference from McCulloch and the rest of the vulgar economists lies, in the instance 
of Marx’s successors, e.g., Varga, solely in the reversed sequence that characterises their 
contradictory assertions: in other words, they concede the overproduction of commodities 
and even ‘turn it into an essential point in their doctrine’ but deny the overproduction of 
capital, whereas Ricardo’s successors conceded the overproduction of capital but denied 
the same for commodities. 
 
For Marx there could be no fundamental distinction between these, for he never stuck to 
the appearances of phenomena but on the contrary sought to penetrate to their core. 
Therefore he says, ‘Thus the only remaining question is: what is the relation between 
these two forms of overproduction, between the form in which it is denied and the form in 
which it is asserted?  (In other words, where is) the nice distinction between 
overabundance of capital and overproduction’ (of commodities)?64    
 
‘The question is, therefore, what is the overabundance of capital and how does it differ 
from overproduction (of commodities)?’ Here Marx lays into Ricardo’s successors with 
remarkable force: ‘According to the same economists, capital is equivalent to money or 
commodities. Overproduction of capital is thus overproduction of money or of 
commodities. And yet these two phenomena are supposed to have nothing in common 
with each other?’ ‘[T]he entire phenomenon resolves into one of overproduction of 
commodities, which they admit under one name and deny under another’.65 ‘[A] 
thoughtlessness which admits the existence and necessity of a particular phenomenon 
when it is called A but denies it as soon as it is called B, and therefore showing scruples 
and doubts only about the name of the phenomenon…’.66  In contrast to them, Marx 
notes that with overproduction one is dealing not simply with the overproduction of 
commodities as commodities but with the ‘fact that commodities figure here no longer in 
their simple determination but in their determination as capital’. ‘It is a question not 
merely of the simple relationship in which the product appears as a commodity, but of its 
social determination in which it is something more than and also different from a 
commodity’, in other words, capital.67 In overproduction understood in this way ‘the 
producers confront one another not purely as owners of commodities but as capitalists’.68 
However, this only means that in the crisis it is that valorisation function of capital that is 
impaired; on the other hand, a capital that fails to valorise itself is a superfluous, 
overproduced capital. Overproduction of commodities and overproduction of capital are 
‘the same phenomenon’. ‘Overproduction of capital and not of individual commodities – 
though this overproduction of capital always involves overproduction of commodities – 
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is nothing more than overaccumulation of capital.’69 An overaccumulation of capital that 
lacks any chance of valorisation. 
 
When does such an overaccumulation occur? Under what conditions? In the existing 
Marxist literature this question was never actually raised, let alone answered.  
 
Lenin too fails to bring sufficient theoretical clarity to the problem of capital exports, 
even if he makes several acute observations on the subject. ‘In the old type of capitalism, 
that of free competition, the export of goods was the most typical feature’, says Lenin. ‘In 
the modern kind, the capitalism of monopolies, the export of capital becomes the typical 
feature…On the eve of the 20th century we see a new class of monopolies coming into 
existence. First there are combinations of capitalists in all advanced capitalist countries: 
secondly, the monopolist position of a few rich countries, in which the accumulation of 
capital reaches gigantic proportions. An enormous “excess of capital” becomes 
accumulated in the advanced countries’.70 The fact of the export of capital is related in 
this passage to the sheer wealth and massive accumulations of capital in the advanced 
capitalist countries, something that seems to be confirmed by empirical observations. 
Lenin displays more penetration when he goes on to underscore the close links between 
governments on one side and high finance and large-scale industry on the other, the latter 
concentrated in trusts and cartels. He sees those links as characteristic of the most recent 
phase of capital expansion, points to firms like Armstrong in England, Schneider in 
France and (before the war) Krupp in Germany, all of which ‘have close connections 
with powerful banks and governments and which cannot easily be “ignored” when a loan 
is being arranged’, and which succeed in dominating certain territories as their exclusive 
spheres of influence by using loans and the creation of colonial banks and their branches. 
In this way ‘[t]he countries exporting capital have divided the world in the metaphorical 
sense of the term’.71  
 
However, this interesting description does not move beyond the purely empirical 
interconnections, in particular (and this may well be due to the popular character of the 
work, which set itself the task of ‘describing the peculiarities of imperialism as briefly 
and simply as possible’) there is no theoretical analysis of the facts that would explain 
why the export of capital becomes indispensable under advanced capitalism. Lenin 
simply confines himself to the suggestion that ‘[t]he necessity to export capital comes 
from the “overripeness” of capitalism in certain countries where (with agriculture 
backward and the masses impoverished) room for “profitable” investment is becoming 
scarce’.72 What this ‘overipeness’ consists of and how it is reflected are not simply not 
explained by Lenin. 
 
The heart of the problem of capital exports lies in showing why it is necessary and under 
what conditions it comes about. Marx’s achievement and his theoretical advance over 
Ricardo were that he did precisely this. 
 
If the migration of capital is regulated by the level of the rate of profit, then it 
presupposes that there are differences in the level of profitability. Marx showed the 
circumstances which determine and bring about a tendential fall in the rate of profit in the 
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course of accumulation. The question arises, how far can this fall go? Call the rate of 
profit fall to zero?  Many theorists believe that only in such a case can we speak of an 
absolute overaccumulation of capital. As long as capital yields a profit, however small, 
we cannot speak of absolute overaccumulation, because the capitalist would rather be 
content with a small profit than have no profit at all and will therefore continue 
production as long as some profit accrues. ‘It follows then from these admissions’, says 
Ricardo, ‘that there is…no limit to the employment of capital while it yields any profit’.73      
 
I shall show that this idea is completely false, that there is a limit to the accumulation of 
capital and that this limit comes into force much earlier than a zero rate of profit . There 
can be absolute overaccumulation even with a relatively high yield on capital. The crux 
of the matter is not the absolute level of that yield but the ratio of the mass of surplus-
value to the accumulated mass of capital. 
 
So, on which conditions does the limit to the accumulation of capital depend?  
Empiricism is useless in the face of questions like this. In this case it fails completely, as 
it does in other areas of science. For example, in the use of fossil fuels, e.g. coal, the 
experience of almost a century has shown that it was always possible to obtain a greater 
quantity of heat from a given quantity of coal. Thus experience based on a practice of 
several decades might easily suggest that there is no limit to the quantity of heat that can 
be obtained through such increases. But only theory can answer the question whether this 
is really true or whether there isn’t a maximum limit here beyond which any further 
increase in the quantity of heat obtainable is ruled out. This answer is possible because 
theory can calculate the absolute quantity of energy in a unit of coal. Increases in thermal 
output cannot exceed 100 per cent of the available quantum of energy. Whether this 
maximal point can actually be reached in practice is of no concern to theory. The 
determination of that limit by theory has considerable importance for our grasp of the 
actual processes. In economics, likewise, the determination of such points which define 
the limits beyond which the actual tendencies of development cannot pass is of the 
greatest significance: only they make it possible for us to have a general picture of the 
forces at work in the mechanism.  
 
Starting from considerations of this sort Marx asks, what is ‘overaccumulation’ of 
capital? And his response is: ‘To understand what this overaccumulation is…we have 
only to take it as absolute. When would the overproduction of capital be absolute?’ 
According to Marx absolute overproduction of capital would occur when an expanded 
capital yields no more surplus-value than the smaller capital did. ‘Thus as soon as capital 
has grown in such proportion to the working population that neither the absolute labour-
time that this working population supplies nor its relative surplus labour-time can be 
extended (the latter would not be possible in any case in a situation where the demand for 
labour was so strong, and there was thus a tendency for wages to rise); where, therefore, 
the expanded capital produces only the same mass of surplus-value as before, there will 
be an absolute overproduction of capital.’74 ‘There would be an absolute overproduction 
of capital as soon as the additional capital that could be employed for the purpose of 
capitalist production = 0.’75 ‘The valorization of the old capital would have experienced 
an absolute decline.’76  
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To have a better sense of the conditions under which such a state of things is bound to 
come about, I propose to study the phenomena involved here by stages and, with Marx, 
first analyse the simplest case where population and labour productivity (technology) are 
held constant before going on to deal with the more complicated case of absolute 
overaccumulation with a growing size of population and growing productivity of labour. 
 
1. Absolute overaccumulation of capital with population and technology held constant 
 
‘If we take a given working population, of 2 million for example, and further assume that 
the length and intensity of the average working day is given, as well as wages, and hence 
also the relationship between necessary and surplus labour, then the total labour of these 
2 million workers always produces the same magnitude of value, and the same thing is 
true of their surplus labour, as expressed in surplus-value.’77 ‘With this presupposition [a 
constant value of labour-power, JB], the rate of surplus-value directly gives us the mass 
of surplus-value.’78 On these assumptions capital accumulation runs up against a maximal 
limit which can be calculated exactly because the maximum amount of the mass of 
surplus-value obtainable is exactly given. It would make no sense to continue 
accumulation beyond this limit, because a larger capital would yield the same mass of 
surplus-value as the smaller capital did before. If accumulation were in fact continued it 
would necessarily bring about a devaluation of capital and a sharp fall in the rate of 
profit. ‘In actual fact, the situation would take the form that one portion of the capital 
would lie completely or partially idle (since it would first have to expel the capital 
already functioning from its position, to be valorized at all), while the other portion 
would be valorized at a lower rate of profit…The fall in the rate of profit would be 
accompanied this time by an absolute decline in the mass of profit…[a]nd the reduced 
mass of profit would have to be calculated on an enlarged total capital.’79  This would 
happen without any ‘actual devaluation of the old capital’. This would be a case of the 
overaccumulation of capital ‘since the capital is unable to exploit labour… at a level of 
exploitation that at least increases the mass of profit along with the growing mass of 
capital applied’.80 Thus according to Marx this would be a case where ‘more capital is 
accumulated than can be  invested in production…This results in loans abroad, etc., in 
short, speculative investments’.81      
 
2.  Absolute overaccumulation of capital with a growing population and changing 
technology (a growing organic composition of capital) 
 
It would be wrong to conclude from what has just been said that absolute 
overaccumulation is only possible when population and technology are held constant. 
Using Bauer’s scheme I have shown that it can and has to arise despite the two 
assumptions underlying the scheme, viz. (a) of a progressively higher organic 
composition of capital (advances in technology) and (b) of annual increases in population 
(by around 5%) including the assumption that capital c grows faster than the increase in 
population expressed by v. Under these conditions absolute overaccumulation does not 
set in immediately but only after a specific moment (Stufe) in the accumulation of capital. 
I showed (See Table 2) that from year 21 the capitalists could have no interest in 
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accumulating the surplus-value of 252,691 obtained in year 20 at the rate followed so far 
(10% for c and 5% for v), because a capital expanded at this rate would be too large to be 
valorised to the same degree given the size of the working population. Their personal 
share of the surplus-value, the k portion, would start falling (from 117,832 to 117,612). 
So instead of accumulating the surplus-value, that is, adding it to the main capital, they 
will earmark it for capital exports.  So this is the moment that Marx has in mind when he 
says ‘More capital is accumulated than can be invested in production…This results in 
loans abroad, etc.’.  Since businessmen are not inclined to cut down on their own 
consumption, there will be a shortage of a, the portion earmarked for accumulation. By 
year 36 there has to be a reserve army of 11,509 workers and at the same time an excess 
capital of 117,174. The upshot of this is the situation described earlier (pp. 52–53 above): 
an excess of capital coupled with an excess of population. Marx illustrates this with the 
case of Britain in early 1867: ‘At this moment, while English workmen with their wives 
and children are dying of cold and hunger, there are millions of English gold…being 
invested in Russian, Spanish, Italian and other foreign enterprises’.82   
 
From this moment on accumulation, that is, the reconversion of a part of the profit into 
additional capital, runs into hurdles. The profit that is destined for accumulation ‘cannot 
be directly used to expand business in the sphere of production in which the profit was 
made’. And this can happen ‘because this sphere is saturated with capital’. And soon 
after that Marx adds, ‘if this new accumulation comes up against difficulties of 
application, against a lack of spheres of investment, i.e. if branches of production are 
saturated and loan capital is over-supplied, this plethora of loanable money-capital proves 
nothing more than the barriers of capitalist production…an obstacle set up by its own 
laws of valorization, by the barriers within which capital can valorize itself as capital’.83  
Of course, the limits to accumulation are specifically capitalist limits, the limits of 
valorisation, and not limits in general. Social needs remain massively unsatisfied, and 
‘[t]he resulting credit swindling demonstrates that there is no positive obstacle to the use 
of this excess capital’.84 Yet from the standpoint of capital there is ‘excess’ capital 
because it cannot be valorised. 
 
A structural transformation of capitalism gradually sets in from the moment just 
described. The more the capitalist class relies on capital exports, the more the bourgeosie 
‘is divorced from an active role in production’, the more it develops into a parasitic 
rentier class, the ‘more superfluous does it become, like the nobility in its time, a class 
that merely lives off revenues’.85    
 
It is absolutely false to claim, as Luxemburg does with reference to the passage cited 
earlier from Theories of Surplus-Value, ‘It is important to establish that his (Marx’s) 
scheme veritably precludes the formation of such excess capital’.86 It is false to argue as 
Luxemburg does that Marx’s ‘scheme contradicts the conception of the capitalist total 
process and its course as laid down by Marx in Capital, volume iii’.87 The essential idea 
underlying that conception is the immanent contradiction between the drive towards an 
unlimited expansion of the forces of production and the limited valorisation possibilities 
of the overaccumulated capital. Precisely this is the necessary consequence of Marx’s 
reproduction and accumulation scheme. Because Luxemburg transformed these limited 
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valorisation possibilities into a limited consumption capacity, she could obviously find no 
trace of the immanent contradiction that Marx refers to in the scheme. Against this Marx 
shows that ‘the valorization of capital founded on the antithetical character of capitalist 
production permits actual free development only up to a certain point, which is 
constantly broken through by the credit system’.88 The limit of overaccumulation, of 
insufficient valorisation, is broken through by the credit system, that is, by export of 
capital and the additional surplus-value obtained by means of it. In this sense the export 
of capital is an essential and characteristic feature of the late stages of accumulation: ‘In 
the old type of capitalism, that of free competition, the export of goods was the most 
typical feature. In the modern kind, the capitalism of monopolies, the export of capital 
becomes the typical feature’.89 The typical difference that Lenin underscores between the 
old and the new capitalism does in fact exist, but it bears no necessary causal relation to 
either competition or monopoly capitalism but is easier to explain in terms of differences 
between early and late phases of capital accumulation in any given capitalist country at a 
given stage in the evolution of its technology.  
 
We should also take into the account the fact that the granting of foreign loans is 
consciously used to secure orders for industry at exaggeratedly high monopoly prices,90 
since the states that grant loans eliminate the competition of foreign competitors. Thus 
foreign loans are also designed to inject additional surplus-value into the domestic 
economy from countries elsewhere in the world and in this way surmount problems of 
imperfect valoriusation that plague the country in question.   
 
So how does Rosa Luxemburg reconcile the fact of capital exports with her theory of  the 
non-realisability of surplus-value within capitalism? She devotes a special chapter called 
‘International Loans’ to this question.91 Over some thirty pages she tells us how the 
capitalist countries of Europe export capital to the non-capitalist countries, how they 
build factories there, create a capitalist system and draw these countries gradually into 
their ‘spheres of influence’. A whole twelve pages of this chapter (The Accumulation of 
Capital, pp. 429ff.) are devoted to ‘the history of international lending to Egypt’. And 
what is proved by this whole discussion? Does she show how the surplus-value produced 
in the fully capitalist countries is ‘realised’ in the non-capitalist ones? Not a jot!  What we 
learn on the contrary is how the fellaheen and other Asian, African, etc., peoples have to 
work long hours for low wages and how they are drawn into the capitalist nexus. In short, 
Luxemburg shows us not how the surplus-value produced under capitalism is realised, 
but how with the help of capital exports an additional mass of surplus-value is generated 
in the non-capitalist countries and brought back to the capitalist ones.  The fact of capital 
exports is not only incompatible with Luxemburg’s theory but stands in direct conflict 
with it. The export of capital bears no relation to the realisation of surplus-value and in 
this sense does not represent a problem of the sphere of circulation, but is on the contrary 
a problem that stems from the sphere of production and relates to the production of 
additional surplus-value abroad. 
 
Had the export of capital been a means of realising the surplus-value produced under 
capitalism in non-capitalist countries, then the fact that capital is exported from one 
capitalist country to another capitalist country such as Germany would be an inexplicable 
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mystery. Germany does import capital from other countries, however, because this has 
nothing to do with the ‘realisation’ of surplus-value. The excess capital in the US, 
Holland or Sweden that is on the lookout for investment is exported to Germany because 
the German working class produces the surplus-value that pays the interest on this 
capital.  
 
Quite apart from the other advantages of an external expansion of capital that I have 
listed previously, such as securing access to raw materials, lucrative concessions and so 
on, the true meaning of capital export lies in the fact that debtor countries are compelled 
to make tribute payments to their creditors. This is precisely what American financial 
expansion in Europe means. Scott Nearing and J. Freeman glimpse its essential aspect in 
the fact that ‘the great nations of Europe are actual or potential tribute payers to the 
United States for at least two generations’; it is a matter of complete indifference whether 
these countries were victors in the world war who raised loans in the US during the war 
itself (officially there are 16 European countries that are debtors to the US) or contries 
like Germany that were vanquished and have fallen prey to the same fate, albeit in 
another form, viz. the Dawes Plan. The authors just cited call the corresponding section 
of their book ‘Stripping economic rivals’ and go on to say: ‘This is the most complete 
modern system of exploitation ever devised and applied in the relations between great 
powers.’92 The humongous capital accumulation of the US can only ensure its own 
valorisation and weaken the underlying breakdown tendency through large-scale and 
massive transfers of surplus-value from abroad.  
 
(c)   Inductive verification 
                                                           
If the theory propounded here is correct, it should not be that hard to test by looking at 
the actual phenomena. It would take me too far to have to provide extensive historical or 
statistical descriptions in this regard.  On the contrary, all I can really do here is point to 
the most important patterns by adducing a few examples and doing so briefly.  
 
I have proposed two sorts of arguments. First, that the valorisation of capital is the 
driving force of capitalism and governs all the movements of the capitalist mechanism, 
both expansion and  contraction. Initially production is expanded because in the early 
stages of accumulation profit grows. Afterwards accumulation comes to a standstill 
because, at  more advanced stages of accumulation and indeed due to the very process of 
accumulation, without the intervention of any other moments, profit necessarily falls.  
 
As for the facts that are crucial to the validity of my theory, I am in the fortunate position 
of not having to adduce any empirical material of my own. I simply need to appeal to the 
works I have already cited – W. C. Mitchell’s on the USA, J. Lescures’ on France, and 
Stamp’s on Great Britain – all of which show that periods of boom and recession are 
functionally connected with the level of profitability and that booms are a phase of 
expanding profit, recessions a phase when profitability is in short supply. 
 
In the second place, however, the arguments I have propounded embrace much more than 
a mere attempt to explain fluctuations of the business cycle. I have tried to define the law 
	   21	  
of motion of capitalism, its secular trend, or, in Marx’s words, the general tendency of 
capitalist accumulation. I have shown how the course of capitalist accumulation is 
punctuated by absolute overaccumulation which appears from time to time in the shape 
of periodic crises that are of purely limited duration. Such overaccumulation becomes 
progressively more acute across the fluctuations of the economic cycle, from one crisis to 
the next, and finally, at advanced stages of accumulation, ends in a state of ‘capital 
saturation’ where the overaccumulated capital faces a shortage of investment 
possibilities, surmounting the ‘saturation’ becomes progressively more difficult and, for 
all these reasons, the capitalist mechanism approaches its final catastrophe with the 
inexorability of a natural process (mit der Notwendigkeit einer Naturerscheinung). The 
superfluous and idle capital can ward off a complete collapse of profitability only through 
the export of capital or by temporary ‘deployment’ on the stock exchange. 
 
Now just as the real movement of the earth around the sun is not something that can be 
proved through direct observation, but is on the contrary negated by the apparent motion 
of the sun and was therefore misconceived and disputed for centuries together by the kind 
of science that simply sticks fast to surface appearances, so too is capitalism’s general 
tendency to breakdown contested by the invocation of ‘facts’ by all those who see only 
the ‘facts’ but not their inner connections.  A whole century after Copernicus various 
scholars contested the rotation of the earth with the argument that if that were true we 
would have to have an immediate perception of the vibration resulting from it. And sixty 
years after the appearance of Marx’s Capital the breakdown tendency is contested with 
similar sorts of arguments, namely, that there has never been a direct perception of any 
such tendency. In thinking in this way one simply ignores the true function of science, 
viz. that the moment the breakdown tendency becomes something directly perceptible its 
prior determination in theory would become superfluous. 
 
In the historical course of capitalist development the ‘state of saturation’ described above 
was not reached by individual countries all at the same time, because many countries 
were still more or less far removed from it. The earliest example of it was the stage 
reached by Holland already in the eighteenth century. England then reached the same 
stage in the 1820s and France by the 1860s. The USA joined this group more recently, 
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